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Abstract: 
The Control Failures × Concerns theory perspective proposes that mind-wandering occurs, in 
part, because of failures to inhibit distracting thoughts from entering consciousness (McVay & 
Kane, 2012). Despite older adults (OAs) exhibiting poorer inhibition, they report less mind-
wandering than do young adults (YAs). Proposed explanations include (a) that OAs’ thought 
reports are less valid due to an unawareness of, or reluctance to report, task-unrelated thoughts 
(TUTs) and (b) that dispositional factors protect OAs from mind-wandering. The primary goal of 
the current study was to test the validity of thought reports via eye-tracking. A secondary goal 
was to examine whether OAs’ greater mindfulness (Splevins, Smith, & Simpson, 2009) or more 
positive mood (Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999) protects them from TUTs. We found 
that eye movement patterns predicted OAs’ TUT reports and YAs’ task-related interference 
(TRI, or thoughts about one’s performance) reports. Additionally, poor comprehension was 
associated with more TUTs in both age groups and more TRI in YAs. These results support the 
validity of OAs’ thought reports. Concerning the second aim of the study, OAs’ greater tendency 
to observe their surroundings (a facet of mindfulness) was related to increased TRI, and OAs’ 
more positive mood and greater motivation partially mediated age differences in TUTs. OAs’ 
reduced TUT reports appear to be genuine and potentially related to dispositional factors. 
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Article: 
Imagine you are reading a journal article when you suddenly realize that your mind has 
wandered to something else. Such off-task thoughts are often referred to as mind-wandering or 
task-unrelated thoughts (TUTs; e.g., Giambra, 1989). Mind-wandering is a common experience, 
with younger adults (YAs) reporting TUTs 30–50% of the time during everyday tasks 
(e.g., Kane et al., 2007; Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010) and 50–70% of the time during 
laboratory tasks (e.g., Antrobus, Singer, & Greenberg, 1966; Jackson & Balota, 2012; McVay, 
Meier, Touron, & Kane, 2013). Mind-wandering is even more prevalent for YAs with poorer 
executive control, at least during challenging tasks (McVay & Kane, 2009; Mrazek, Franklin, 
Phillips, Baird, & Schooler, 2013; Randall, Oswald, & Beier, 2013; Rummel & Boywitt, 
2014; Unsworth & McMillan, 2013). This finding has led to the Control Failures × Concerns 
theory, which posits that people use executive control to suppress distracting thoughts, 
particularly when their current concerns are cued by the context (McVay & Kane, 2010; 
see Smallwood & Schooler, 2006, 2013 for an alternative view). McVay and Kane (2010) argue 
that when executive control fails, off-task thoughts intrude into consciousness, distracting from 
the ongoing task. Given the findings for YAs, one would predict that older adults (OAs), with 
their decreased working memory capacity (Hasher & Zacks, 1988; Salthouse, 1991; Schaie, 
1994), would engage in more frequent mind-wandering. However, OAs consistently 
report fewer TUTs compared to YAs (Giambra, 1989; Jackson & Balota, 2012; Krawietz, 
Tamplin, & Radvansky, 2012; McVay et al., 2013; Zavagnin, Borella, & De Beni, 2014). 
The present study examines two broad categories of explanation often given for why OAs report 
fewer TUTs: (a) OAs underreport TUTs in the laboratory due to a reporting bias or lack of 
awareness (Einstein & McDaniel, 1997; Jackson & Balota, 2012; McVay et al., 2013; Zavagnin 
et al., 2014) and (b) OAs experience fewer TUTs due to dispositional factors. Specifically, OAs 
have been proposed to be protected from TUTs through better emotional regulation (Zavagnin et 
al., 2014) or by processing information more mindfully (Jackson & Balota, 2012). We address 
the validity of OAs’ thought reports by using eye movements as a behavioral correlate of mind-
wandering. As a secondary aim, we also consider mediation models for mood and mindfulness as 
measured via questionnaires. 
Mind-wandering is often assessed in the laboratory via self-reports collected during a task where 
participants are periodically and unpredictably asked about their current thoughts. Thought 
reports have been used in a number of tasks, including reading comprehension (Foulsham, 
Farley, & Kingstone, 2013; McVay & Kane, 2012; Reichle, Reineberg, & Schooler, 
2010; Smilek, Carriere, & Cheyne, 2010; Uzzaman & Joordens, 2011), go/no-go vigilance tasks 
(Jackson & Balota, 2012; McVay & Kane, 2009; McVay et al., 2013; Mrazek et al., 2011), and 
everyday activities (Kane et al., 2007; Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; Song & Wang, 2012). 
In addition to allowing participants to indicate on-task thoughts and TUTs, some studies allow 
reporting thoughts about one’s performance on the ongoing task, known as “task-related 
interference” (TRI; McVay & Kane, 2009; McVay et al., 2013; Mrazek et al., 2011; Mrazek, 
Smallwood, Franklin, et al., 2012; Smallwood, O’Connor, & Heim, 2005). Like TUTs, TRI 
experiences are associated with increased task errors in the moment, despite being task related 
(McVay & Kane, 2009; McVay et al., 2013; Mrazek et al., 2011; Mrazek, Smallwood, Franklin, 
et al., 2012; Smallwood et al., 2005). In contrast to TUTs, OAs engage in more TRI compared to 
YAs (McVay et al., 2013; Zavagnin et al., 2014). Although OAs report more TRI, they still 
report more on-task thoughts overall, but the age difference in mind-wandering is significantly 
reduced when TRI is considered (McVay et al., 2013). 
Reporting Bias and Eye Movements 
 
Because mind-wandering studies rely on self-reports, an unresolved issue is whether OAs’ 
reporting accurately indicates their experience. OAs may be reluctant to report TUTs if they 
believe that off-task thinking reflects poorly on them (Giambra, 1989; Jackson & Balota, 
2012; McVay et al., 2013; Zavagnin et al., 2014), or they may have less access to what they were 
just thinking and, by default, report thinking about the task. Although McVay et al. (2013, pp. 
144–145) point to multiple findings validating OAs’ thought reports, the present study leveraged 
eye-tracking to examine validity by testing whether on-task thoughts, TRI, and TUTs differ at a 
behavioral level in OAs and YAs. 
Eye movements during reading differ when individuals are mind-wandering relative to when 
they are on task (Foulsham et al., 2013; Reichle et al., 2010; Smilek et al., 2010; Uzzaman & 
Joordens, 2011). However, previous research does not identify a consistent signature for these 
thought types. Reichle et al. (2010) and Foulsham et al. (2013) found longer gaze durations 
preceding TUTs. However, Smilek et al. (2010) found no difference in a similar measure 
(fixation duration) but did find an increase in blink rate preceding TUTs. Reichle et al. 
(2010) found an increase in off-text gazes preceding TUTs and longer gazes for longer words 
preceding on-task thoughts but not TUTs. Uzzaman and Joordens (2011)found a decrease in 
recursive eye movements (within-word regressions) and fewer fixations in general (fewer words 
fixated and total fixations) preceding TUTs—suggesting that participants generally skip more 
words when mind-wandering. However, Reichle et al. (2010) found no difference in the number 
of words fixated preceding TUTs. Thus, it is important to conceptually replicate previous 
findings to examine which measures most reliably indicate TUTs during reading. 
Furthermore, no study has examined eye movements and mind-wandering in OAs, and no eye 
movement studies have allowed TRI reports. The present study tested a somewhat larger sample 
of YAs than other eye-tracking studies of mind-wandering and also examined eye movements in 
OAs to assess the validity of their thought reports. If OAs’ eye movements preceding TUTs and 
on-task reports vary in ways similar to those of YAs, this would provide additional support for 
the validity of their thought reports. However, if OAs’ eye movements preceding TUTs and on-
task thought reports are less distinguishable than those of YAs, this may indicate an inability or 
unwillingness to report TUTs. We will also compare eye movements for on-task thoughts and 
TUTs to those for TRI. 
Mood 
The second major aim of this study is to consider the contribution of dispositional factors to 
OAs’ less frequent reports of mind-wandering. A particular factor that might influence the 
experience of and age differences in mind-wandering is mood. OAs typically indicate greater 
positive affect, lower negative affect, and greater life satisfaction compared to YAs (Carstensen, 
Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999; Grühn, Kotter-Grühn, & Röcke, 2010). This is particularly relevant 
because research with YAs demonstrates that negative mood is related to greater mind-
wandering (Kane et al., 2007; Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; McVay, Kane, & Kwapil, 
2009; Mrazek, Smallwood, & Schooler, 2012; Smallwood, Fitzgerald, Miles, & Phillips, 2009). 
We investigate the possibility that OAs’ decreased negative affect and increased positive affect 
may explain age differences in TUT rates. 
Negative affect 
Smallwood et al. (2009) found that YAs induced into negative mood made more errors and 
reported greater TUTs and TRI. In experience sampling studies, participants indicate more 
negative affect (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010) and reduced positive affect and greater anxiety 
(Kane et al., 2007; McVay & Kane, 2009) when reporting TUTs. Likewise, self-reported 
dysphoria predicts increased TUTs and TRI (Smallwood et al., 2005). The current study 
examines whether OAs’ lower negative affect contributes to their lower TUT frequency. 
Positive affect 
The broaden-and-build theory of positive psychology suggests that positive affect is associated 
with a broadening of attention beyond the central focus to peripheral information (Fredrickson, 
2001). This may result from a decrease in inhibition and wider distribution of cognitive resources 
(Biss & Hasher, 2011; Rowe, Hirsh, & Anderson, 2007), which should result in increased TUTs. 
By contrast, any mood-induced increase in cognitive resources (Fredrickson, 2001) might allow 
OAs to use these resources to suppress TUTs. Consistent with this latter interpretation, on-task 
thoughts were associated with increased self-reported happiness in YAs (and TUTs associated 
with less) in experience sampling studies (Kane et al., 2007; McVay & Kane, 2009). We thus 
examine the possibility that OAs’ higher levels of positive affect contribute to their lower 
frequency of TUTs. 
Mindfulness 
Mindfulness is a multifaceted construct, which involves being nonjudgmentally engaged in, and 
aware of, the present (Langer, 2000; Prakash, De Leon, Patterson, Schirda, & Janssen, 
2014; Teper, Segal, & Inzlicht, 2013). It is not surprising, then, that researchers have linked 
mindfulness to having fewer TUTs (Mrazek et al., 2013; Mrazek, Smallwood, & Schooler, 
2012; Prakash et al., 2014). Engaging in 2 weeks of mindfulness training, 8 min of mindful 
breathing, or scoring high on dispositional measures of mindfulness (the Mindful Attention 
Awareness Scale [MAAS]; Brown & Ryan, 2003) were all related to fewer TUTs on laboratory 
tasks (Mrazek et al., 2013; Mrazek, Smallwood, Franklin, et al., 2012; Mrazek, Smallwood, & 
Schooler, 2012). 
Consistent with the socioemotional selectivity theory (Carstensen, 1992, 1995), which proposes 
that people become more fully oriented in the present with aging, Splevins, Smith, and Simpson 
(2009) found that OAs scored higher on two facets of mindfulness (observing and acting with 
awareness; Baer, Smith, & Allen, 2004) compared with YAs from previous studies. Thus, we 
tested the possibility that OAs’ greater mindfulness accounts for their lower TUT rate compared 
to YAs. 
Current Aims 
The primary purpose of this study was to examine whether OAs’ thought reports are valid. An 
additional purpose was to consider whether dispositional factors might underlie age differences 
in TUT rates. To address the first question, we compared eye movements between thought 
reports in OAs and YAs during a reading task. We use thought reports that distinguish between 
TUTs and TRI to also consider how TRI influences eye movements. To address the possibility 
that dispositional factors influence age differences in TUTs, we examine mood and mindfulness 
as potential mediators of age differences in TUTs. These latter analyses are intended to provide 
valuable information to guide future studies of the mechanisms underlying age differences in 
mind-wandering. 
If OAs’ thought reports are as valid as those by YAs, then on-task thoughts are expected to 
produce patterns of eye movements that differ from those during TUTs, with a similar pattern for 
OAs and YAs. Conversely, we might question the validity of OAs’ thought reports if OAs’ 
patterns of eye movements are less differentiated compared to those of YAs. If TRI results in 
mindless reading akin to TUTs, then we should see a similar pattern of eye movements preceding 
TUTs and TRI. If, however, TRI involves a less complete decoupling of thoughts from the text, 
then eye movements preceding TRI may be more similar to those preceding on-task thoughts. If 
mood or mindfulness contributes to age differences in TUTs and TRI, then age differences in 
thought reports should be reduced when including these as mediators. 
Method 
Participants 
We tested 36 YAs (ages 18–25) and 40 OAs (ages 60–85). YAs were undergraduates 
participating for course credit. OAs were recruited via newspapers and paid a modest 
honorarium. All participants scored greater than 20/50 on a test of near visual acuity, and no 
participants reported a history of dementia or stroke. Nine OAs and seven YAs were excluded 
from eye-tracking analyses due to poor tracking but were retained for other analyses. OAs took 
more medications, scored higher on vocabulary (Ekstrom, French, & Harman, 1976) and lower 
on processing speed (Salthouse, 1993), and read for pleasure more hours per week relative to 
YAs (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Participant Demographics 
 Young Old  
 M SD M SD p d 
Demographics 
Age 19.50 1.32 69.00 5.37   
Education 13.19 1.24 15.70 2.62 <.001 1.22 
Processing speed 40.97 7.17 27.34 5.98 <.001 2.06 
Vocabulary 42.21 11.09 58.06 20.82 <.001 0.95 
Medications 0.89 0.98 2.60 2.31 <.001 0.96 
Reading for 
pleasure 
1.75 1.87 9.60 6.10 <.001 1.74 
Note. Education = years of education; processing speed = number correct; vocabulary = 
percentage correct on the Advanced Vocabulary Test (Ekstrom et al., 1976); medications = 
number of daily medications; reading for pleasure = estimated number of weekly hours spent 
reading for pleasure. 
Materials and Apparatus 
Eye-tracking equipment 
Participants completed the reading task while wearing an Applied Science Laboratories head-
mounted eye-tracker (Model H6HS with eye–head integration) recording at a sampling rate of 
120 Hz. Participants sat approximately 61 cm away from a 27 × 34 cm liquid crystal display 
(LCD) monitor with the resolution set to 1,024 × 768. Pupil diameters of zero lasting more than 
100 ms were considered blinks and were removed before analyses (excepting blink rate 
analyses). Areas of interest (AOIs) were drawn around each word, extending roughly 0.5 cm to 
the bottom, left, and right and 1.0 cm above. 
Reading task 
Participants read the first five chapters of Tolstoy’s War and Peace, presented via E-Prime 
software. The text comprised 153 screens in gray-on-black 22-point DotumChe font, with as 
many complete sentences as could fit onto each screen (3–97 words per screen; M = 47.30, SD = 
22.14). Participants pressed the space bar to advance screens and could not reread previous 
screens. 
The reading was divided into 20 blocks of seven to eight screens plus one thought probe. Probes 
were placed randomly within blocks, but two screens with <10 words were never probed. For 
probed screens, the probes interrupted reading randomly between 3 and 8 s following screen 
onset. If a participant pressed the space bar before the probe (6% and 9% of trials for OAs and 
YAs, respectively), they were immediately shown the probe. Following the probe, the text screen 
reappeared to allow participants to finish reading before advancing. 
Thought probes asked “What were you just thinking about?” Response options and their 
descriptions appeared as follows: (a) the text: focused on reading the actual textual content on 
screen; (b) reading-related: images or thoughts related to the content of the text, but not directly 
corresponding to the actual words on the screen; (c) task performance: evaluating how 
effectively you were understanding or remembering the text; (d) everyday things: thinking about 
recent or impending life events; (e) current state of being: thinking about conditions such as 
hunger or sleepiness; (f) personal worries: thinking about concerns, troubles, or fears; (g) 
daydreams: fantasies disconnected from reality; and (h) other. Participants also read a thorough 
description of each thought category in the initial instructions. Participants responded using the 
numbered keys 1–8. If the participant indicated a response other than “the text,” they were asked 
“Before the probe, were you aware that your thoughts were about something other than the 
task?” Participants then indicated yes or no (pressing 1 or 2, respectively). 
Mood 
Current mood was assessed using the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, 
Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). The PANAS consists of 10 items measuring momentary positive affect 
and 10 items measuring momentary negative affect using a 5-point Likert scale (1 = very slightly 
or not at all, 5 = extremely). 
Mindfulness 
The Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ; Baer, Smith, Hopkins, Krietemeyer, & 
Toney, 2006) was developed from existing scales, including the Kentucky Inventory of 
Mindfulness Skills (KIMS) scale (Baer et al., 2004) and MAAS (Brown & Ryan, 2003) used in 
previous studies of mindfulness and mind-wandering (Mrazek, Smallwood, & Schooler, 
2012; Splevins et al., 2009). The 39 FFMQ items each load onto one of five factors: acting with 
awareness, nonjudging of internal experience, nonreactivity to internal experience, describing, 
and observing. Participants responded on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = never or very rarely true, 5 
= very often or always true). 
Procedures 
Consenting participants completed a demographics questionnaire, processing speed test, 
vocabulary test, PANAS, and FFMQ. Participants were offered a break prior to the 9-point 
calibration of the eye-tracker. 
Participants were then instructed on the reading task and were informed that a true–false 
comprehension test would follow it. At no point was the term “mind-wandering” used. 
Participants were then asked to predict how often they would report thinking about something 
other than the text (0–100%) and to predict their performance on the comprehension test (50–
100%). Tracker recalibration occurred whenever the technician noted that calibration was 
compromised (M = 2.97 times, SD = 1.94). 
Following the reading, participants completed a 14-item comprehension test (Jackson & Balota, 
2012). Participants then estimated how often they thought about something other than the text 
(0–100%) and their performance on the comprehension test (50–100%). Lastly, participants 
completed a posttask survey regarding their experience (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Performance and Self-Ratings 
 
Note. Percentage of TUTs = percentage of thought reports indicating a TUT; percentage of TRI 
= percentage of thought reports indicating TRI; percentage of reading-related = percentage of 
thought reports as “reading-related thoughts or images”; percentage of TUT prediction = 
estimated percentage of time participant will have TUTs on the upcoming reading; percentage of 
TUT postdiction = estimated percentage of time participant had TUTs on the previous reading; 
reading time = median reading time per page in seconds; comprehension prediction _ estimated 
percentage of true–false questions participant will get correct on the comprehension test; 
comprehension postdiction = estimated percentage of true–false participant got correct on the 
comprehension test. The following were rated on a scale from 1 = not at all to 7 = very: reading 
difficulty = response to “Please rate how difficult you found the reading”; motivation _ response 
to “Please rate how motivated you were to keep your thoughts on task”; control over thoughts = 
response to “Please rate how in control you were of your thoughts”; fatigue = response to “Please 
rate how fatiguing you found the reading”; tracking fatigue = response to “Please rate how 
fatiguing you found wearing the eye-tracking headgear”; tracking discomfort = response to 
“Please rate how uncomfortable you found wearing the eye-tracking headgear”; consciousness of 
eye movements = response to “Please rate how conscious you were about your eye movements 
while reading”; proportion tune-outs for TUTs = proportion of TUT responses followed by a 
“yes” response to the question “Before the probe, were you aware that your thoughts were about 
something other than the task?”; proportion tune-outs for TRI = proportion of TRI responses 
followed by a “yes” response to the question “Before the probe, were you aware that your 
thoughts were about something other than the task?” 
Results 
We first report age differences in TUTs, TRI, and reading comprehension that replicate previous 
findings. We next address the issue of thought report validity, examining both comprehension 
and eye movements. Lastly, we consider whether mood or mindfulness mediates age differences 
in TUTs and TRI. 
Thought Reports and Comprehension Data 
We coded thought reports of “the text” as on task and reports of “task performance” as TRI. 
Because “reading-related thoughts and images” might, like TRI, reflect a middle ground between 
on- and off-task thinking, this thought category (which constituted an M of 15% of all thought 
reports with a range of 0–38%) was excluded from the primary analyses but is reported in 
separate exploratory analyses at the end of the Results section. All remaining thought reports 
were coded as TUTs. We then computed the proportion of TUTs and TRI for each participant. 
OAs reported fewer TUTs, t(74) = 5.05, p < .001, d = 1.17, and more TRI, t(74) = 2.03, p = 
.046, d = 0.47, compared to YAs (see Table 2). Importantly, the age difference in on-task 
thoughts was also significant, t(74) = 2.10, p = .039, d = 0.48, replicating previous findings that 
OAs’ increased rate of TRI do not fully account for age differences in off-task thinking (McVay 
et al., 2013). OAs also read more slowly than YAs, t(74) = 2.69, p = 009, d = 0.63. OAs’ and 
YAs’ comprehension scores did not differ, t(74) < 0.01, p = .991. These age differences replicate 
previous findings. 
Thought Report Validity 
To address whether OAs’ and YAs’ thought reports are equally valid, we examine a combination 
of performance and eye-tracking data. 
Comprehension, TUTs, and TRI 
To assess the impact of TUTs and TRI, we conducted a pair of Age × TUT/TRI regressions on 
comprehension scores. More TUTs were associated with poorer comprehension, F(1, 72) = 
16.10, p < .001, η2 = .18, with no age difference or interaction (F < 1). Thus, TUTs appeared to 
hinder OAs’ and YAs’ comprehension similarly (e.g., McVay et al., 2013). By contrast, neither 
TRI rate, F(1, 72) = 0.52, p = .473, nor age, F(1, 72) < 0.01, p = .991, related to comprehension. 
A significant Age × TRI Rate interaction, F(1, 72) = 4.43, p = .039, η2 = .06, indicated that 
higher TRI rates were associated with poorer comprehension for YAs, F(1, 34) = 4.20, p = .048, 
η2 = .11, but not OAs, F(1, 38) < 1. 
To foreshadow, this reflects a general pattern in the present data, whereby TRI was associated 
with greater disruption in processing for YAs than for OAs. This may indicate that TRI affects 
OAs’ and YAs’ task processing differently. By contrast, it may be that OAs and YAs have 
different criteria for indicating TRI, compromising report validity. For example, YAs may be 
more conservative with the use of the TRI category, reporting less pronounced TRI instances as 
on-task or TUTs. It is worth noting, however, that increases in TRI reporting by YAs would 
either increase the magnitude of the obtained age difference in on-task thinking (if TRI were 
misclassified as on task) or leave the age difference in on-task thinking unchanged (if TRI were 
misclassified as TUTs). We consider these interpretations further in the Discussion. 
Eye-tracking analyses 
Eye-tracking data were analyzed via 2 (age: young, old) × 3 (thought report: on-task, TUT, TRI) 
mixed models with thought report within subjects. Because some participants did not report all 
three thought categories, SAS Proc Mixed (Littell, Milliken, Stroup, & Wolfinger, 2000) was 
used to include participants with missing data. As noted previously, individual words were used 
as areas of interest. Analyses examine eye movements on the to-be-probed page during the 3–8 s 
preceding the probe (comparable to the time frame used by Reichle et al., 2010, and Uzzaman & 
Joordens, 2011). 
We examine both fixation and gaze data. Fixation durations measure the time a participant’s eye 
rests on one location before moving to a different location. A participant may make single or 
multiple fixations within a word (e.g., first fixating the “a,” then the “e” in “Napoleon”). Gazes 
aggregate fixations, measuring the time from first fixation on a word until a fixation is made 
elsewhere. In the example above, “Napoleon” included two fixations but a single gaze. 
Analyses included the following measures: (a) how often participants looked at areas without 
text (off-text fixation counts, total time off text); (b) number of words fixated on their first pass 
through the text (first-pass fixations); (c) number of times gaze moved backward to a previous 
portion of text (between-word regressions); (d) number of total words fixated on a page (words 
fixated); (e) gaze duration; (f) total time spent on each word, collapsing initial gazes and 
regressions (total time per word); and (g) blink rate. The omnibus statistical tests are reported 
in Table 3; data are graphed in Figures 1 and 2. 
 
Table 3. Statistics for Eye-Tracking Analyses 
 
Note. Bold values in Tables 3 and 4 indicate effects significant at the p < .05 level. df = degrees 
of freedom. 
Figure 1. Means and standard errors for off-text fixation count (a), total time outside the areas 
of interest in seconds (b), and blink count in the 5 s preceding the probe (c). All measures are 
collapsed across the 3–8 s of reading on the page preceding the probe except blink count. 
 
Figure 2. Means and standard errors for first-pass fixation count (a), regression count (b), 
fixation count (c), and gaze durations in milliseconds (d). All measures are collapsed across the 
3–8 s of reading on the page preceding the probe. 
Off-text fixation counts 
Off-text fixations may occur when a participant is mind-wandering and allows their gaze to fall 
outside the text. Off-text fixation counts did not differ by age. However, there was a significant 
Age × Thought Report interaction. For YAs, focused comparison revealed a trend toward more 
off-text fixations when reporting TRI compared to on-task thoughts, t(88) = 1.63, p = .108, d = 
0.41, and TUTs, t(88) = 1.58, p = .118, d = 0.45, which did not differ from each other, t(88) = 
0.05, p = .959. For OAs, focused comparison revealed significantly more off-text fixations when 
reporting TUTs compared to when reporting on-task thoughts, t(88) = 2.16, p = .033, d = 0.41, or 
TRI, t(88) = 2.58, p = .012, d = 0.47, which did not differ, t(88) = 0.54, p = .594. 
Similar to Reichle et al. (2010), then, we found no difference in YAs’ off-text fixations for on-
task thoughts and TUTs. However, TUTs were associated with more off-text fixations for OAs. 
We also found that TRI was (nonsignificantly) associated with more off-text fixations for YAs. 
As will be seen, this general pattern of greater disruption in eye movements for OAs preceding 
TUT reports and YAs preceding TRI reports occurs for several measures. Importantly, these 
results are inconsistent with the hypothesis that OAs report fewer TUTs because they classify 
TUTs as on-task thoughts or TRI. If that hypothesis were supported, we would see less (not 
more) differentiation between OAs’ TUT and on-task reports relative to YAs’. 
Total time off text 
Off-text fixation counts treat single brief fixations outside the AOIs the same as more extended 
fixations; the extent to which a participant gazes outside the text is better captured by a duration 
measure. However, outcomes for total time off text were similar to those for fixation counts. 
Total time outside the AOIs did not differ by age, and the Age × Thought Report interaction was 
again significant. For YAs, focused comparison indicated a nonsignificant trend toward greater 
time spent off text when reporting TRI compared to on-task thoughts, t(88) = 1.83, p = .070, d = 
0.47, and TUTs, t(88) = 1.84, p = .070, d = 0.50, which did not differ from each other, t(88) < 
0.01, p = .997. In OAs, focused comparison revealed significantly more time spent off text when 
reporting TUTs compared to on-task thoughts, t(88) = 2.61, p = .011, d = 0.47, and TRI, t(88) = 
3.13, p = .002, d = 0.56, which did not differ from each other, t(88) = 0.67, p = .504. 
First-pass fixation counts 
First-pass fixations include only fixations that occur during the first pass through the text and are 
thought to represent early low-level text processing (Reichle et al., 2010). First-pass fixations did 
not differ with age but did differ by thought report. Focused comparisons indicated that on-task 
thoughts were associated with more first-pass fixations relative to TUTs, t(88) = 2.11, p = 
.037, d = 0.27, and TRI, t(88) = 2.92, p = .004, d = 0.43, which did not differ, t(88) = 0.64, p = 
.525. 
The Age × Thought Report interaction was not reliable. However, to directly consider the 
hypothesis that OAs’ and YAs’ eye movements are similarly affected by TUTs and TRI relative 
to on-task thoughts, we examined focused comparisons between on-task thoughts and TUTs and 
TRI in each age group. Compared to when reporting on-task thoughts, YAs made significantly 
fewer first-pass fixations when reporting TRI, t(88) = 2.43, p = .017, but not TUTs, t(88) = 
0.54, p = .590. This pattern was reversed for OAs, with fewer first-pass fixations for TUTs, t(88) 
= 2.30, p = .024, but only a nonsignificant trend for TRI, t(88) = 1.69, p = .095. Thus, we are 
hesitant to conclude that TUTs and TRI similarly reduce the number of first-pass fixations in 
OAs and YAs. 
Words fixated 
This count includes words fixated during the first pass and during rereading/regressions and may 
indicate TUTs if people are more or less likely to fixate words during off-task thinking. By 
contrast, people often skip highly predictable words during on-task reading (e.g., Rayner, 
Reichle, Stroud, Williams, & Pollatsek, 2006) and thus may fixate more words during TUTs if 
they fail to skip these predictable words. Data from previous studies are mixed, either supporting 
fewer fixations during TUTs (Uzzaman & Joordens, 2011) or no difference (Reichle et al., 
2010). 
Here, words fixated did not differ by age, but the main effect of thought report was qualified by 
an Age × Thought Report interaction. Focused comparisons indicated that YAs fixated fewer 
words when reporting TRI compared to on-task thought reports, t(88) = 2.72, p = .008, d = 0.58, 
and TUTs, t(88) = 3.85, p < .001, d = 0.87, which did not differ from each other, t(88) = 
1.21, p = .230. By contrast, OAs fixated fewer words when reporting TUTs compared to on-task 
thoughts, t(88) = 2.01, p = .047, d = 0.62; words fixated did not differ between TRI and 
TUTs, t(88) = 0.79, p = .434, or TRI and on-task thoughts, t(88) = 1.41, p = .163. 
Between-word regression counts 
Regressions occur when fixations move backward (e.g., from the fifth word to the third). 
Regressions are common during reading and can represent meaningful reprocessing of text 
(Rayner, 1998; Rayner et al., 2006); thus, regressions should be less common during TUTs. 
However, neither Reichle et al. (2010) nor Foulsham et al. (2013) found a difference in 
regressions preceding TUTs and on-task thoughts. 
Here, OAs made more regressions compared to YAs—consistent with general research on aging 
and reading (Rayner et al., 2006). Contrary to predictions, participants made more between-word 
regressions when reporting TUTs compared to on-task reports, t(88) = 3.62, p < .001, d = 0.47, 
and TRI, t(88) = 4.33, p < .001, d = 0.58, which did not differ, t(88) = 0.92, p = .360. The Age × 
Thought Report interaction was not significant. 
As with first-pass fixations, we examined focused comparisons within each age group to directly 
test whether OAs’ and YAs’ eye movements are similarly affected by TUTs. YAs made 
significantly more regressions preceding TUTs compared to on-task reports, t(88) = 2.13, p = 
.036, and TRI, t(88) = 3.24, p = .002. This pattern held for OAs as well, t(88) = 2.94, p = .004, 
and t(88) = 2.92, p = .004, respectively. Thus, we conclude that TUTs increase between-word 
regressions in both OAs and YAs. 
Gaze duration 
Gaze durations measure the amount of time spent on each word, whether an initial or subsequent 
gaze. Reichle et al. (2010) found that participants made longer gazes prior to TUTs. We found no 
age difference in gaze durations but did find a main effect for thought report. Focused 
comparisons show that gazes were longer when reporting TRI compared to on-task reports, t(88) 
= 2.70, p = .008, d = 0.13, and TUT reports, t(88) = 2.68, p = .009, d = 0.15, which did not 
differ, t(88) = 0.50, p = .620. An Age × Thought Report interaction (p= .059) suggests that the 
effect of thought report was driven primarily by YAs. For YAs, gaze durations were longer for 
TRI compared to on-task reports, t(88) = 3.28, p = .002, d = 0.19, and TUT reports, t(88) = 
3.40, p = .001, d = 0.17, which did not differ, t(88) = 0.09, p = .925. By contrast, there were no 
differences in gaze durations between thought reports for OAs, all t < 1.00, all p > .50. Again, 
YAs showed greater disruption in gaze patterns when reporting TRI compared to on-task and 
TUT reports. 
Word length effects 
Reichle et al. (2010) found that participants gazed at longer words for longer durations, but only 
when on task. We thus added the number of letters as a continuous variable to the gaze duration 
model that already included age and thought report as predictors. Only the main effect of length, 
with longer words receiving longer gazes, was significant. A nonsignificant Length × Thought 
Report interaction suggests that the effect may have been larger in TRI relative to TUTs and on-
task thoughts. 
As with the above measures, we examined the pattern within age groups to test the hypothesis 
that OAs’ and YAs’ eye movements are similarly affected by TUTs and TRI but using Thought 
Report × Length mixed models for each age group. For YAs, longer words received longer 
gazes, F(1, 2,771) = 105.53, p < .001. The main effects of thought report, F(2, 48) = 1.41, p = 
.254, and Length × Thought Report interaction were not significant, F(2, 2,771) = 1.61, p = .201. 
This pattern held for OAs as well, with longer words receiving longer gazes F(1, 2,881) = 
106.98, p < .001. The main effects of thought report, F(2, 40) = 0.65, p = .530, and Length × 
Thought Report interaction were not significant, F(2, 2,881) = 1.69, p= .184. In summary, word 
length effects on gaze duration were present for both OAs and YAs but did not vary by thought 
report. It is noteworthy that the War and Peace text uses a number of uncommon words and 
complex sentence structure, both of which can influence reading times (Rayner et al., 2006). We 
elaborate on this issue in the Discussion. 
Blink rate 
Blink rates had a strong positive skew, and the majority (YAs, 68%; OAs, 71%) of probed trials 
involved zero blinks in the preceding 5 s. Because neither data transformation nor nonparametric 
comparisons can account for these issues, we simply note the data patterns rather than using 
inferential statistics. 
Smilek et al. (2010) found that blinks were more common in the 5 s preceding a TUT report. 
Using their analyses, we obtain a similar pattern, with both OAs and YAs blinking more 
preceding TUT and TRI reports versus on-task reports (see Table 3). This pattern seems to 
support the thought report validity of both OAs and YAs. However, whereas Smilek et al. 
(2010) report this directional difference for all 15 of their participants, the current study found 
more blinks preceding TUTs for only 52% of YAs and 38% of OAs; comparable numbers for 
TRI were 59% of YAs and 46% of OAs. Thus, blinks seem inadvisable as a substitute measure 
for thought self-reports. 
Validity summary 
Previous studies (McVay & Kane, 2012; Smallwood, McSpadden, & Schooler, 2008; Unsworth 
& McMillan, 2013) demonstrated that frequent TUTs are associated with poorer comprehension 
for YAs, and we obtained the same decrement for both age groups. By contrast, reporting more 
TRI was only associated with poorer performance among YAs. This pattern supports the validity 
of thought reports but also suggests that TRI during reading may be qualitatively different 
between YAs and OAs. 
Both age groups made more regressions when reporting TUTs and blinked more when reporting 
TUTs and TRI. However, off-text fixations, total time off text, and number of words fixated 
suggested greater disruption in text processing for OAs when reporting TUTs and greater 
disruption in YAs when reporting TRI. These results may indicate that OAs and YAs are 
differentially affected by TUTs and TRI or that OAs and YAs classify TUTs and TRI differently. 
Importantly, these results do not support the hypothesis that OAs misclassify TUTs as on-task 
thoughts. 
Dispositional Influences 
Our consideration of possible dispositional factors underlying OAs’ less frequent mind-
wandering focused on mood and mindfulness. We expected that OAs would score higher overall 
on positive affect and mindfulness and lower on negative affect. Furthermore, we predicted that 
these might protect against TUTs. Although there is little previous work to guide predictions for 
the relationships between TRI and mood, we conducted exploratory analyses. Mood assessed 
after reading correlated more strongly with thought reports during the reading than did mood 
assessed before reading. Because mood is probably influenced by the task, we focus on mood 
after testing here but report means (see Figure 3) for mood at both times. 
 
 
Figure 3. Means and standard errors for PANAS scores. 
OAs scored higher on positive affect, t(74) = 6.87, p < .001, d = 1.59, and on all facets of 
mindfulness (all p < .05, d = .52–.68; Figure 4) compared to YAs. By contrast, negative affect 
was near the floor for both age groups, with only a trend toward OAs being less negative, t(74) = 
1.95, p = .055, d = .45. 
 
Figure 4. Means and 
standard errors for mindfulness (FFMQ) scores. 
Correlations with TUTs and TRI are reported in Table 4. We also report the outcomes of 
exploratory mediation models, but we caution against overinterpreting null results, as the tests 
are underpowered. Among mindfulness measures, only the ability to describe sensations (FFMQ 
description scale) was related to fewer TUTs. As predicted, greater negative affect was related to 
more TUTs, and greater positive affect was related to fewer TUTs. The indirect effect of age on 
TUTs through positive affect was also significant, suggesting that OAs’ more positive affect may 
in part explain their lower TUT rate, perhaps by increasing their available cognitive resources to 
inhibit distraction (Fredrickson, 2001). Regarding our exploratory consideration of TRI, only 
those scoring higher on the tendency to observe and notice surroundings (FFMQ observation 
scale) were more likely to report TRI. The indirect effect of age on TRI through FFMQ 
observation was also significant, suggesting that OAs’ increased tendency to observe their 
surroundings may partially explain their greater reporting of TRI. 
 
Table 4. Correlations and Mediation Analyses 
 
Note. The sample size for these analyses is N = 76, as we were able to use data from participants 
who did not provide adequate eye-tracking data. Mediation analyses were computed using 
bootstrapped confidence intervals (based on 5,000 resamples) around the indirect effects (Hayes, 
2009). Bold values in Tables 3 and 4 indicate effects significant at the p < .05 level. 95% CI LL 
= lower limit for 95% confidence interval; 95% CI UL = upper limit for 95% confidence 
interval. 
Age differences in task interest and engagement may also influence mind-wandering (Jackson & 
Balota, 2012; Krawietz et al., 2012; McVay et al., 2013; Zavagnin et al., 2014). Participants’ 
motivation to keep their thoughts on the task was greater among OAs and correlated negatively 
with TUTs. The indirect effect of age on TUTs through motivation was significant, suggesting 
that motivation may play a role in OAs’ lower TUT rate. Because our motivation question was 
framed in reference to the just-completed task, which included thought probes, we interpret these 
effects cautiously; the validity of this measure might be compromised by the recollection and 
interpretation of individuals’ mind-wandering experiences. 
An influence of task engagement on age differences in mind-wandering is also suggested by a 
correlation between a pretask report of how often the participants read for pleasure and TUTs. 
However, more targeted research is needed to understand the role of task interest and 
engagement on age differences in mind-wandering. This research must carefully consider pre- 
versus posttask assessments, as the latter may be compromised by reactive effects and cause–
effect ambiguities (i.e., does low interest increase TUTs, or do frequent TUTs lower 
retrospective evaluations of interest?). 
Analysis of our posttask survey revealed other outcomes that might warrant further investigation 
(see Table 2). OAs reported having generally better control over their thoughts during the task, 
consistent with the age comparison for individual thought reports. However, OAs were less 
aware of TRI prior to thought probes (i.e., less frequently “tuned out”). YAs reported being more 
fatigued by the eye-tracking headgear and were more conscious of their eye movements, which 
might indicate that they were more prone to distracting thoughts from external sources. 
Reading-Related Thoughts 
In addition to on-task, TRI, and TUT reports, we also included (in an exploratory vein) an option 
for “reading-related images or thoughts related to the content of the text, but not directly 
corresponding to the actual words on the screen.” Both age groups reported a similar number of 
reading-related thoughts, t(74) = 0.10, p = .932, d = 0.15. However, these thought reports were 
not related to comprehension scores, r = .09, p = .440. When compared with TRI and on-task 
reports, reading-related thoughts were indistinguishable on all eye movement variables (p > .05), 
with the exception of first-pass fixations. Reading-related thoughts were associated with fewer 
first-pass fixations than TRI, t(98) = 2.27, p = .025, d = 0.37, and were therefore more similar to 
on-task thoughts. 
Discussion 
Thought Report Validity 
Our data generally support thought reports as a valid measure of mind-wandering in both age 
groups. Neither performance nor eye movements demonstrated less pronounced distinctions 
between on-task thoughts and TUTs for OAs compared to YAs. We replicated previous findings 
of fewer TUT reports and more TRI reports by OAs, and our data argue against the idea that 
OAs are less likely to report TUTs due to a bias against or lack of awareness of mind-wandering. 
Eye movement regressions were more frequent preceding TUTs than on-task reports for both age 
groups. OAs showed greater differentiation in eye movements between TUTs and on-task 
thoughts for off-text fixations, total time off text, and words fixated, whereas YAs showed 
greater differentiation between TRI and on-task thoughts for these measures. 
Previous studies on eye movements and mind-wandering produced contradictory findings 
(Foulsham et al., 2013; Reichle et al., 2010; Smilek et al., 2010; Uzzaman & Joordens, 2011), 
perhaps due to methodological differences. If differences in eye movements are not dependably 
found across texts and thought-probe methodologies, then eye-tracking data are unlikely to be 
useful as a behavioral measure of mind-wandering and replacement for self-reports. However, 
we do believe that eye movements can be a useful tool for comparing the impact of mind-
wandering between groups for a given task, as we demonstrate here. 
We consistently found that eye movements and comprehension in YAs were more disrupted by 
TRI than TUTs. This pattern may suggest that experiencing TRI disrupts reading or that 
comprehension difficulties cause both disruptions in reading and thoughts about task 
performance. Prior studies of eye movements with mind-wandering have not accounted for TRI 
(Foulsham et al., 2013; Reichle et al., 2010; Uzzaman & Joordens, 2011) or have instructed 
participants to categorize TRI as TUTs (Smilek et al., 2010). As a result, TRI may have been 
misclassified as TUTs in prior studies and thus driven relationships between eye movements and 
TUTs in YAs. By contrast, our data suggest that OAs’ eye movements are disrupted more by 
TUTs than TRI. As noted above, this is inconsistent with a reporting bias explanation of age 
differences in TUTs. If OAs misreport TUTs as on-task thoughts, then eye movements preceding 
TUT reports and on-task reports should be more similar for OAs than for YAs. 
Alternatively, it may be that the interaction between age and thought reports for eye movement 
measures indicates a difference in the use of thought report categories by OAs and YAs. 
Although our data are inconsistent with the hypothesis that OAs misclassify TUTs as on-task 
thoughts, it is possible that OAs have a more liberal criterion for reporting TRI compared to 
YAs. That is, OAs may classify some relatively on-task thoughts as being TRI—hence the 
greater similarity between OAs’ on-task and TRI reports. By contrast, YAs may have a more 
liberal definition of TUTs—hence the greater similarity between their on-task and TUT reports. 
TRI may be proactive in some cases, reflecting intentional comprehension monitoring and 
strategic planning. It may also be reactive in response to comprehension failures. OAs typically 
show similar metacognitive monitoring accuracy relative to YAs (Hertzog & Dunlosky, 2011). 
The “cognitive sparing” of metacognitive monitoring might reflect a greater tendency to self-
assess performance by OAs, making monitoring a well-practiced skill. This could explain the 
lesser disruption in OAs’ eye movements when reporting TRI. Compared to YAs, OAs were less 
likely to report that they were aware of their TRI prior to the thought probe. This is consistent 
with the hypothesis that monitoring may be fairly automatic in OAs and might thus occur 
without effort, awareness, or disruption. By contrast, if YAs engage in self-assessment less often 
than do OAs, they may report TRI primarily when reacting to markedly poor performance. If this 
is the case, it could explain the greater disruptions in eye movement patterns and the negative 
TRI–comprehension correlation for YAs. In accordance with the idea of TRI being more reactive 
in YAs, YAs reported greater consciousness of their eye movements during the task (see Table 
2). However, these explanations are largely speculative and thus warrant additional research. 
It is important to note that our task departed substantially from naturalistic reading. Accurate 
measurement of word fixations required use of a large font, and the number of words per screen 
was therefore always <100 words. The War and Peace text also contains long sentences, which 
sometimes required limiting a screen to a single sentence. We used this text to allow relatively 
direct comparisons to previous work, but future research should examine mind-wandering and 
eye movements in a wider variety of reading and other tasks to more fully understand how and 
when mind-wandering occurs in OAs and YAs. 
Dispositional Influences 
Age differences in off-task thoughts (combining TUTs and TRI) were reduced but remained 
significant after accounting for OAs’ greater TRI (see also McVay et al., 2013). OAs’ more 
positive mood and interest/motivation after the reading task also contributed to their lower TUT 
rate but not their higher TRI rate. By contrast, we did not find evidence that mindfulness 
contributes to OAs’ lower TUT rate and found evidence for only minor contributions to OAs’ 
higher TRI rate. 
Mindfulness 
OAs scored higher on all five facets of mindfulness. Prior studies have found that brief 
mindfulness training (Mrazek et al., 2013) and dispositional mindfulness (Mrazek, Smallwood, 
& Schooler, 2012) are associated with reduced TUTs. However, we did not find consistent 
relationships between mindfulness and mind-wandering reports; only one subscale correlated 
with TUTs (description scale), and only one subscale correlated with TRI (observation scale). 
In addition to low power, the failure to find a strong TUT/TRI–mindfulness relationship may 
also stem from the mindfulness scale we used. The FFMQ comprises general statements about 
one’s propensity to behave in certain ways and thus should tap trait-level, as opposed to state-
level, mindfulness. State mindfulness is likely to vary based on situational factors and might 
better relate to age differences in mind-wandering (e.g., State–MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003). 
Indeed, recent research finds only moderate (and varied) correlations between state- and trait-
level mindfulness measures (Tanay & Bernstein, 2013). 
Negative affect 
Negative moods, whether induced (Antrobus et al., 1966; Smallwood & O’Connor, 2011) or 
preexisting (Smallwood et al., 2005), are associated with increased TUTs and TRI. Negative 
affect is generally low in laboratory settings and in our study did not mediate age differences in 
either TUTs or TRI. It remains unknown whether more extreme levels of negative affect, as from 
mood induction, would impact TRI (particularly its more reactive form) in either OAs or YAs. 
Alternatively, other measures may be more sensitive to differences in negative affect likely to be 
found under normal laboratory conditions. 
Positive affect 
Positive affect did mediate the age–TUT (but not the age–TRI) relationship, with greater positive 
affect associated with fewer TUTs. Mrazek, Smallwood, and Schooler (2012) did not find this 
association in YAs, but their research did not separate TRI (which does not correlate with 
positive affect) from TUTs and on-task thinking, which may have diluted any affect–TUT 
relationships in their data. It is important to note that the current TUT–positive affect correlation 
was found within both age groups and so was not an artifact of age. 
The broaden-and-build perspective suggests that positive affect broadens attention, either by 
more widely distributing attention to peripheral details or increasing available cognitive 
resources (Fredrickson, 2001). The latter explanation is consistent with our results and may 
explain why positive affect partially accounted for OAs’ lower TUT rate, with OAs having more 
available resources to inhibit distracting thoughts. A contrasting view suggests that mind-
wandering produces negative mood (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010), and so OAs may remain 
more positive because they mind-wander less. It is important to note, however, 
that Killingsworth and Gilbert (2010) measured mood with a single 0 (completely unhappy) to 
100 (completely happy) scale, whereas the PANAS independently measures positive and 
negative affect (as in having high levels of both excitement [positive] and anxiousness 
[negative]). Our results do not indicate that mind-wandering produces negative affect; changes in 
negative affect from pre- to posttask were not correlated with TUTs, r = .08, p = .468. In 
contrast, both our data and those from Killingsworth and Gilbert (2010) could be interpreted as 
mind-wandering decreasing positive affect. In our study, changes in positive affect from pre- to 
posttask correlated with TUTs, r = −.37, p = .001. 
Motivation 
Unsworth and McMillan (2013) demonstrated that self-reported interest and motivation 
correlated with TUTs among YAs, and Krawietz et al. (2012) showed a similar pattern for 
interest in OAs. The current study found that motivation mediated age differences in TUTs. 
However, motivation reports in our study, as well as those in Unsworth and McMillan 
(2013) and Krawietz et al. (2012), were collected following the task and so might have been 
reactive to thought-probe responses and task performance. We also obtained a relationship 
between TUTs and pretask reports of how often people read for pleasure, which provides a less 
problematic connection between task interest and mind-wandering. 
Conclusions 
Our data indicate that OAs’ less frequent TUTs cannot be explained by a reporting bias. We did 
obtain evidence that positive affect and task engagement may be partly responsible for OAs’ 
lower TUT rate compared to that of YAs. Future research should further examine the impact of 
dispositional factors such as mood, mindfulness, and task engagement on TUTs and TRI 
(distinguishing proactive from reactive TRI) using measures that are focused on both state- and 
trait-level measures (e.g., State–MAAS and FFMQ), as well as within other task domains. 
Footnotes 
1 Reichle, Reineberg, and Schooler (2010) also found a number of effects for self-caught TUTs 
(where the participant presses a key whenever he or she notices that he or she is thinking about 
something other than the task) that were not found for probe-caught TUTs, and they interpret 
these differences as due to meta-awareness rather than meaningful eye movements. 
2 This data loss is typical for tracking studies (Frank, Touron, & Hertzog, 2013; Isaacowitz, 
Wadlinger, Goren, & Wilson, 2006; Rayner, personal communication, August 4, 2011; Stine-
Morrow et al., 2010; Touron, Hertzog, & Frank, 2012). 
3 The DotumChe font was chosen because it is a monospace font, meaning that each letter 
subtends the same degree of visual angle, allowing for longer words to subtend a proportionally 
larger degree of visual angle irrespective of the particular letters in the word. This simplifies the 
analysis of word length effects. 
4 We obtained one observation with a gaze duration greater than 3 standard deviations above the 
mean. However, exclusion of this outlier did not influence the pattern of results for any measure; 
thus, it is included in all reported analyses and figures. 
5 When trials with 0 blinks are eliminated, 60% of YAs and 33% of OAs blink more during 
TUTs than on-task reports, and 70% of YAs and 50% of OAs blink more during TRI compared 
to on-task thoughts. 
6 Mrazek, Smallwood, and Schooler (2012) did not report means or standard deviations for the 
PANAS, so a direct comparison is not possible. Their study also did not produce a negative 
correlation between TUTs and performance, which could indicate important differences between 
the methods (categorical vs. continuous measures of mind-wandering) and samples used in their 
study and the current study. 
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